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ABSTRACT

This Note discusses analogous themes in two religious
public display cases, Lautsi v. Italy, recently decided by the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), and Salazar v. Buono, recently handed down by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Broader critiques of ECHR religious
jurisprudenceare addressed in the context of the interpretation
and application of the principle of neutrality and the argument
that secularism is not a necessarypostulate of this demand. It is
this theme of the relationship between neutrality and secularism

1.
The title is not meant to suggest that crosses (or crucifixes) are secular or
that secularism is neutral, but, instead, as this Note will emphasize, to highlight the
irony in both courts' recent consideration of religious symbols. In explaining the
message which the cross, and certainly a crucifix, conveys, the Apostle Paul states that
the message of the gospel and the cross of Christ itself, as both a symbol and a
historical event, are divisive: "For Christ did not send me to baptize but to preach the
gospel, and not with words of eloquent wisdom, lest the cross of Christ be emptied of its
power. For the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to us who are
being saved it is the power of God." 1 Corinthians1:17-18 (English Standard Version).

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45.'841

that is also prominent in the American discussion about the
relationship between government and religion. Finally, this
Note returns to Lautsi's themes as they are present in the
American context to contend that applicationsof secularism and
neutrality to the public square work against a preferable notion
of constitutional pluralism that favors neither religious nor
nonreligiouspublic displays. The debate surrounding the Lautsi
decision, particularly in its earlier iteration before the Grand
Chamber's most recent decision, provides a valuable lens for
scrutinizing U.S. neutrality. True pluralism maintains an
equivocal demeanor with respect to both religious and
nonreligiouspublic displays. This Note offers the Lautsi case's
context as a useful space in which to gain an outsider
perspective with respect to how pluralism functions in U.S.
religious display cases.
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C.

Religious display cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) invoke theoretical ideals,
applied to particular complaints about the transgression of the state's
neutrality with respect to religion. Secularism, pluralism, and
neutrality are most profitably understood in context. This Note seeks
to explore some particular contexts in order to comment on the
desirability of accepting pluralism, an inclusive ideal, as an
interpretive key, rather than secularism, often discussed as if it were
2
a neutral ideal.

I. BACKGROUND: LAUTSI V. ITALYAND ANALOGOUS THEMES FROM
SALAZAR V. BUONO

On Wednesday, June 30, 2010, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR
in Strasbourg 3 heard Italy's appeal of the November 3, 2009 Chamber

2.
In order to explore the polarizing nature of secularism as a worldview, Os
Guinness provides this definition of the process of secularization:
Properly defined, secularization is the process through which the decisive
influence of religious ideas and institutions has been neutralized in successive
sectors of society and culture, making religious ideas less meaningful and
religious institutions more marginal. In particular, it refers to how our modern
consciousness and ways of thinking are restricted to the world of the five
senses.
Os GUINNESS, THE CALL: FINDING AND FULFILLING THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF YOUR
LIFE 148 (2d ed. 2003) (emphasis omitted). Observe that Guinness uses the term
"neutralized" to mean minimized or made less potent, not as the concept of neutrality
is used throughout this Note, connoting equivalent treatment without preferring one or
the other-here, religious or nonreligious perspectives. Guinness's definition of the
term is cited at this point not as particular authority, but as an example of how
nonneutral secularism and secularization are seen from the religious perspective.
3.
For an explanation of the Grand Chamber's role in ECHR adjudication, see
The Grand Chamber, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/
The+Court/The+Court/The+Grand+Chamber (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). The Lautsi
case reached the Grand Chamber on referral, and the Grand Chamber is composed of
the President, Vice Presidents, section presidents, the national judge (the judge of the
state against which the applicant, here, Ms. Lautsi, is complaining), and other judges
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ruling in favor of the applicant in Lautsi v. Italy.4 In that opinion, the
ECHR held the rights of Soile Lautsi, an Italian citizen, and the
rights of her children had been violated by the presence of a crucifix
in the children's classrooms at the state school they attended. 5 Ms.
Lautsi believed that the crucifixes were a religious display that
violated the principle of secularism that safeguarded her own desires
for her children's education. 6 Ms. Lautsi had pursued the domestic
resolution of her complaint before the Veneto Regional
Administrative Court on July 23, 2002, claiming that the crucifix
display violated the constitutional principles of secularism and
impartiality. 7 In 2005, her complaint was dismissed, with the Italian
administrative court concluding that the crucifix was no mere
religious symbol but was instead closely interwoven with Italian
history, culture, and identity and with the state's secularism
8
embodied in such core concepts as equality, liberty, and tolerance.
The Italian government asserted the following additional "principles"
when arguing before the ECHR in 2009: "non-violence, the equal
dignity of all human beings, justice and sharing, the primacy of the
individual over the group and the importance of freedom of choice, the
separation of politics from religion, and love of one's neighbour
extending to forgiveness of one's enemies." 9 On February 13, 2006,
the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) dismissed the applicant's
appeal. 10 Prior to the rulings of the Regional Administrative Court
and of the Council of State, Ms. Lautsi had attempted to bring her
suit before the Italian Constitutional Court." In January 2004, the
administrative court granted her request to submit her case before
the Constitutional Court; however, the Constitutional Court
concluded that it had no jurisdiction because the provisions requiring
the crucifixes to be placed in classrooms were administrative
statutory regulations, and the Constitutional Court only interprets

randomly assigned, but excluding judges who heard the case previously before the
Chamber, which issued the original decision appealed to the Grand Chamber. Id.
4.
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber Hearing
Lautsi v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. Press Release 531 (June 30, 2010). For a brief
introductory discussion to the ECHR, see generally Brett G. Scharffs, Symposium
Introduction: The Freedom of Religion and Belief Jurisprudenceof the European Court
of Human Rights: Legal, Moral, Political and Religious Perspectives, 26 J.L. &
RELIGION 249, 250-59 (2010) (highlighting the rights guaranteed by Article 9 and the
way in which the Court proceeds to address complaints raised under this article).
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, supra note 4.
5.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Lautsi v. Italy, 50 Eur.Ct. H.R. 42, 35 (2009).
10.
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, supra note 4.
6-15.
11.
Lautsi, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R.
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laws of the legislature. 12 After failing to achieve a satisfactory
domestic result in the Italian courts, Ms. Lautsi then appealed to the
ECHR, which resulted in the previously referenced 2009 ruling
challenged by Italy and reversed in the Grand Chamber's final
judgment in its opinion of March 18, 2011.13 In 2009, the ECHR held
that there had been violations of the right to education, found in
Article 2 of Protocol 1,14 in conjunction with the rights of freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion guaranteed in Article 9 of the
15
European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention).
Italy, believing that its ordinances and practice of placing crucifixes
in the classroom were not in violation of the European Convention,
appealed the decision and, in the March 1-2, 2010 five-judge panel
meeting, the Grand Chamber of the ECHR accepted the request for
appeal. 16 On March 10, 2011, the ECHR issued a press release stating
that on March 18, 2011, the Grand Chamber would deliver its final
judgment in the Lautsi case at a public hearing in Strasbourg. 17 The
Grand Chamber's decision differed from the prior ruling, concluding
that there was no violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (the right to
education) and no separate issue under Article 9 (the rights of
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion).18
Because the 2009 ruling sparked controversy among parties to

See Gabriel Andreescu & Liviu Andreescu, The European Court of Human
12.
Rights' Lautsi Decision: Context, Contents, Consequences, J. FOR STUD. RELIGIONS &
2010, at 48, 48-49, available at http://jsri.ro/ojs/
Summer
IDEOLOGIES,
index.php/j sri/article/view/26/27.
Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2011).
13.
14.
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Mar. 20, 1952, 5 C.E.T.S. 33, 34 ("Right to education:
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which
it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious
and philosophical convictions.").
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
15.
Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 5 C.E.T.S. 5, 11.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Id.
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, supra note 4.
16.
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Forthcoming Grand
17.
Chamber Judgment in the case of Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. Press
Release 200 (Mar. 10, 2011).
74-78.
Lautsi, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R.
18.
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the European Convention, the Court authorized third parties to
present written observations and permitted eight of the ten party
governments the right to intervene during the hearing. 19 These
intervening countries were represented by Joseph Weiler, who
repeated many of his primary arguments from the hearing in a
scholarly editorial. 20 In addition to the government interveners, the
Court authorized thirty-three members of the European Parliament
to jointly submit observations and allowed written comments from a
variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) on both sides of the
21
case.
During his oral argument before the Grand Chamber, Joseph
Weiler denounced the prior ruling for its disregard of the longestablished margin of appreciation doctrine2 2 and briefly compared
various countries'-both European and non-European-responses to
publicly displayed religious symbols. 23 Weiler labeled the original
Lautsi decision an "Americanization of the European system" because
of the Court's inappropriately broad requirement that Italy, a country
that does not abide by a "rigid American style separation of church
and state," remain neutral with respect to religion. 24 This
characterization of the U.S. Constitution's Establishment Clause as
interpreted by the Supreme Court is probably more accurately a
description of the jurisprudence of former Supreme Courts,
25
particularly the Warren and Burger Courts.
In the Establishment Clause application to most instances of
religious public display, there has been considerable variation in the

19.
The Governments of Armenia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Malta,
Monaco, Romania, the Russian Federation, and San Marino were authorized to submit
written comments, and eight of these ten were allowed to intervene at the hearing.
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, supra note 4.
20.
See generally Joseph Weiler, Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom Redux, 21
EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2010) (discussing the flaws in the November 3, 2009 ruling and the
incompatibility of this ruling with both the Court's jurisdiction and the domestic
treatment of religious symbols by European states that are parties to the Convention).
21.
Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, supra note 4.
22.
See infra Part II.F (discussing the margin of appreciation doctrine).
23.
Grand Chamber: Lautsi v. Italy No. (30814/06), EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. (June
30, 2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHREN/HeaderPressMultimedia[Webcasts+of+
public+hearings/webcastENmedia?id=20100630- i&lang-en&flow=high.
24.
Id.
25.
See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 115, 116 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992)
(claiming that while "[tlhe animating principle" of the Warren and Burger Courts "was
not pluralism and diversity, but maintenance of a scrupulous secularism in all aspects
of public life touched by government," there was "reason to believe this period [was]
coming to an end"). In 1992, McConnell was speculating about the direction of the
Rehnquist Court; however, modern commentators have similarly noted that the
current Roberts Court has likewise shown a tendency to propel the "triumph of
majoritarianism when it comes to the Establishment Clause." Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Future of the First Amendment, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 623, 641 (2010).
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degree of neutrality mandated, the tests applied, and the rationales
employed. 2 6 Decisions have often been closely split; in one of these,
McCreary v. ACLU, Justice Scalia, in dissent, described the nature of
American secularism quite differently from Weiler. 27 Recounting a
conversation with a European jurist, he observed that the United
States is not a strictly secular country, as distinguished from, for
example, France, 28 and commented that the U.S. model does not
demand that "[r]eligion [be] strictly excluded from the public
29

forum."

Weiler's reference to the American system and his
characterization of the degree to which the U.S. Constitution
incorporates the principle of lafcit6 (secularism) provides a thematic
link tying this current ECHR case to concepts present in the recent
Supreme Court case, Salazar v. Buono, which also dealt with the
public display of a cross. 30 Although the facts of Lautsi and Salazar
31
reference public cross displays in dramatically different contexts,
this Note focuses on points of comparison in their treatment of the
principle of neutrality.
One example of the relevance of this prominent theme in Lautsi
to the Salazar case comes from a series of questions Scalia posed
during the oral argument in Salazar.32 The respondent Frank Buono,
a former employee of the Mojave National Preserve in southeastern
California, contested whether a Latin cross memorial erected in 1934
by the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) as a commemoration to the
dead of World War I was constitutionally displayed within the
preserve on Sunrise Rock. 33 Buono claimed that the cross-a religious
Clause of the First
the Establishment
symbol-violates
Amendment. 34 However, during oral argument, there was a dispute
concerning the symbolic nature of the cross when Scalia asked
Buono's attorney, Peter Eliasberg, whether the cross honored nonChristians who fought in the war (presumably in addition to honoring
Christians). 35 Eliasberg stated that he did not believe the cross had

26.
See infra Part IV (discussing American religious public display cases and
analyzing the case of Salazar v. Buono).
See McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27.
See id. ("That is one model of relationship between church and state-a
28.
model spread across Europe by the armies of Napoleon, and reflected in the
Constitution of France, which begins 'France is [a] .. .secular ... Republic.'... This is

not, and never was, the model adopted by America.").
29.
Id.
30.
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010).
31.
See infra Parts II, IV.C (discussing Lautsi and Salazarrespectively).
32.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-39, Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803
(2010) (No. 08-472).
33.
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1811-12.
34.
Id. at 1812.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 32, at 38.
35.
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such a purpose, noting that while the memorial did not state that it
honored Christians exclusively, "a cross is the predominant symbol of
Christianity and it signifies that Jesus is the son of God and died to
redeem mankind for our sins. ' 36 Scalia responded by saying, "It's
erected as a war memorial. I assume it is erected in honor of all of the
war dead. It's ... the most common symbol ... of the resting place of
the dead .... -37 The Supreme Court was grappling in these moments
of the oral arguments (if not in the opinion as a whole) with whether
a cross, seemingly a religious symbol, actually bears more generalized
cultural messages.
While Italy used a similar characterization of the crucifix as an
undergirding argument in Lautsi, Weiler questioned whether this
argument was either appropriate or necessary to Italy's case. At the
hearing, as well as in his journalistic writing, he explained how this
attempt to ameliorate opponents' concerns about the crucifix display
by misconstruing the symbol is not a useful contribution to the debate
about religion in the public square. 38 Considerable debate fuels this
discussion about religion, secularism, and the demands of neutrality
in the public sphere in the United States and, as can be seen from the
European responses to the first Lautsi ruling, this conversation has
39
its variations on the other side of ocean.
Part II of this Note briefly discusses the meaning and application
of laicitd (secularism) in Italy, as well as the arguments set forth in
Lautsi, the ECHR's reasoning in the original 2009 decision, and the
contentions of the opposing parties at the recent hearing. This section
of the Note concludes, in agreement with the final Lautsi ruling, that
Lautsi was initially wrongly decided, that the Court should have
applied the margin of appreciation doctrine to the Italian context, and
should have deferred, within the bounds of the European Convention,
to the particular relationship to religion the internal government and
courts have established. Part III of this Note addresses broader
critiques of ECHR religious jurisprudence in the context of the
interpretation and application of the principle of neutrality and the
argument that secularism is not a necessary postulate of this
demand. It is this theme of the relationship between neutrality and
secularism that is also prominent in the American discussion about
the relationship between government and religion. In Part IV, this
Note's focus shifts to the American context to discuss analogous cases
in order to provide some points of comparison for how the U.S.

36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 38-39.
38.
See supra note 20.
39.
See infra Parts III, IV (critiquing ECHR religious jurisprudence and
discussing U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the First Amendment and American
religious public display cases).
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Supreme Court (standing in this Note as the ultimate American
constitutional authority as juxtaposed with the ECHR, a source of
"constitutional" interpretation in Europe) and the ECHR respond to
principles of secularism and neutrality in the governing documents
they interpret: the U.S. Constitution and the European Convention,
respectively. 40 Part V returns to the relevance of Lautsi's themes to
the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. This Note concludes that
the Constitution should be interpreted to promote a pluralism that
favors neither religious nor nonreligious public displays. Such an
inclusive interpretation would eschew an unswerving secularism that
cannot exemplify the much touted neutrality.

II. LAUTSI V. ITALY
A. Brief Background: The Principle of Laicit6 (Secularism)in Italy
Following the fall of fascism and the return of democratic
government in Italy, the country underwent a "[p]rocess of
secularisation" that continues to impact Italian society and
legislation. 41 However, even though the Constitutional Court has
concluded that laicit&-equivalent to laicit in the Italian context-is
a constitutional principle so essential as to be immune from
amendment, Italy apparently does not believe secularism is
contravened by religious education, taught by Church-appointed and
regulated Catholic teachers, in state schools. 42 Even though Italy no
longer claims Roman Catholicism as its state religion, the Church
continues to play a vital role in Italian politics. 43 Additionally,
political disputes often arise when the government enacts policies
contrary to the teachings of the Church. 4 4 The public display of
religious symbols, in schools as well as courtrooms and public
45
buildings, has led to domestic lawsuits, such as that of Ms. Lautsi.
The Italian courts' response to crucifixes in schools suggests potential
46
difficulties with imposing secularism.

40.
Id.
41.
Giulio Ercolessi, Italy: Born as a Secular State in the XIX Century, Back to
a Clerical Future in the XX Century?, in SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN
EUROPE 139, 143 (Fleur de Beaufort et al., 2008).
42.
Id. at 143-44.
43.
MARIO B. MIGNONE, ITALY TODAY: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 268 (2008).
44.
Id. at 268-69. For example, Mignone notes the influence of the Catholic
Church on 2004 legislation which aligned with Catholic teachings in limiting the use of
reproductive technology. Id. at 268.
45.
Id.
46.
See generally Susanna Mancini, Taking Secularism (Not Too) Seriously:
The Italian 'Crucifix Case,' 1 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 179, 179-82 (2006) (describing the
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B. ECHR Chamber Ruling in Lautsi, November 3, 2009
The original ECHR judgment in Lautsi is very brief. 47 Despite its
brevity, however, the Court helped to shape the battle lines that
formed subsequent to this landmark decision. The crucifixes that Ms.
Lautsi's children encountered in their classrooms at school were
technically required by Italian law, although the state had not
uniformly enforced this provision. 48 The provision requiring such
crosses dates back to the 1922 Ministry of Education's Circular No.
68. The crosses replaced both the images of Christ and of the King in
the state schools. 49 A subsequent circular in 1926 and two Royal
Decrees in 1924 and 1928 confirmed this rule, which the Italian
courts have declared to remain applicable. 50 Ms. Lautsi, as the
applicant in the case, argued that the Italian government was in
violation of the European Convention. 5 1 First, Ms. Lautsi did not
believe that the provisions requiring crucifixes were constitutional in
light of the Italian Constitution's secularism principle; however,
because of the nature of these regulations, the Constitutional Court of
Italy concluded it did not have jurisdiction to assess the legality of the
regulations themselves. 52 Second, she argued that the cross does
carry a religious-not a merely secular-message, and by displaying
the crucifixes in the classroom, the state showed preference to the
Catholic Church, thus interfering with the rights to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion of Ms. Lautsi and her children, as
well as her right to "bring up her children in conformity with her
moral and religious convictions. '5 3 Finally, Ms. Lautsi commented on
the pressure these symbols exerted on minors against their freedom
of conscience. 54 In sum, she contended that the symbols compromised
the state's secularism, defined to require the state to be "neutral and
'5 5
keep an equal distance from all religions.
Italy first responded to Ms. Lautsi's arguments by contending
that this question of the crucifix's presence in the classroom was not
merely legal, but that it required consideration of the meaning of the

principle of secularism and crucifix display in the Italian context prior to the ECHR
ruling in Ms. Lautsi's case and discussing its examination in the Italian courts).
47.
See Weiler, supra note 20, at 1 ("Independently of one's view of the
substantive result, the decision of the Second Chamber of the ECtHR is an
embarrassment.... All these issues are encapsulated in Lautsi. All are disposed of,
Oracle like, in 11 impatient and apodictic paragraphs.").
48.
Lautsi v. Italy, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 42, 9 19-20 (2009).
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
27-35.
52.
Id.
27-30.
53.
Id.
27-35.
54.
Id. 99 31-35.
55.
Id.
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cross itself, a meaning which Italy argued is "perfectly compatible
with secularism and accessible to non-Christians and nonbelievers. ' 56 Second, Italy argued that its reading of the symbolic
57
nature of the cross was compatible with prior ECHR case law.
Third, the issue of the public display of religious symbols fell within
the broad margin of appreciation, traditionally left by the Court to
the rulings of domestic bodies, particularly in such spheres as
education. 58 This argument dovetailed with Italy's claim that there
was "no European consensus" about the practice and concept of
59
secularism.
The Court's opinion developed principles it derived from prior
cases.60 The Court listed five principles: (1) Article 2 of Protocol 1
should be interpreted in consideration of Articles 8-10 of the
Convention; (2) the right to education implies a right of parents to
respect for their religious and philosophical convictions, and the state
should aim for pluralism in education; (3) schools should foster an
inclusive learning environment that provides students with options
rather than excluding particular viewpoints; (4) the state may not
indoctrinate-its curriculum should focus on being "objective, critical,
and pluralistic;" and (5) in consideration of respect for parental
religious convictions and of children's own beliefs, the state has a
"duty of neutrality and impartiality" that is "incompatible with any
kind of power on its part to assess the legitimacy of religious
convictions or the ways of expressing those convictions."'61 Applying
these principles, the Court concluded that the crucifix has a number
but that the religious meaning is
of different ' meanings,
"predominant. 62 In addition, the Court thought it was correct to
interpret the crucifix as a religious symbol favoring a particular
religion that could be emotionally disturbing and impinge on the
negative freedom from religion. 63 Moreover, the crucifix does not
further educational pluralism and is not compatible with educational
neutrality. 64 The Court therefore found that the display of crucifixes
in classrooms of state schools was a violation of the previously
referenced Article 9 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol 1.65

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
36-41.
Id. I 36-46.
Id.
36-41.
Id. 47,

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

48-54.

63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.

54-62.
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C. ECHR Grand ChamberHearing in Lautsi, June 30, 2010
During the summer 2010 hearing before the Grand Chamber,
arguments of both parties and of third-party intervening countries
continued to focus on the nature of secularism, the implications of
secularism for education, and the relationship between secularism
and neutrality. 6 6 The status of crucifixes as religious symbols
continued to feature prominently in the discussion.67 Ms. Lautsi's
attorney, quoting Voltaire, attempted to describe secularism as a
principle that would provide for the right of all people, including
secular parents, to educate their children in accordance with their
own beliefs. 68 The applicant described Article 2 of Protocol 1 as
requiring education to be absent of any pressure whatsoever from the
state because the state's role is to create a neutral and pluralistic
69
atmosphere for children.
Additionally, in response to Italy's contention that ECHR
intervention against the will of the state would violate the margin of
appreciation, 70 the applicant contended that there was a European
consensus on this issue.7 1 The applicant arrived at this consensus by
narrowing the issue to crucifix display in classrooms instead of
considering the broader question of whether there is uniform
72
European practice related to religious displays in public settings.
Surely, the latter consideration would have yielded the opposite
conclusion, insofar as European consensus is relevant to determining
whether the ECHR has interfered with domestic regulation unduly.
In keeping with the effort to narrow this issue, the applicant's
attorney argued that a ruling in this case would have no effect on
symbols in any other public venues, but that this case was solely
about classroom displays and applied only in Italy. 73 This argument
was particularly unusual due to the fact that the applicant and the
state, as well as the prior ruling from the lower chamber, all looked to
ECHR jurisprudence concerning religious symbols in other contexts
74
in order to ascertain the appropriate treatment of this request.
Presumably, the Court, applicants, and parties appearing before it in

66.
Grand Chamber: Lautsi v. Italy No. (30814/06), supra note 23.
67,
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
See infra Part II.E (discussing how the margin of appreciation principle
permits countries to make their own determinations about morality issues due to lack
of European consensus).
71.
Grand Chamber:Lautsi v. Italy No. (30814/06), supra note 23.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Lautsi v. Italy, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 42,
36-37 (2009) (discussing numerous
cases dealing with religious symbols).
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the future will continue to appeal to its previous rulings and to apply
the ideas and precedents they create to new contexts.
The attorneys for Italy likewise began with a discussion of
secularism. 75 Italy argued that Ms. Lautsi had entirely misunderstood
the nature of secularism as mandating that the state disengage
completely from the realm of religion. 76 Italy firmly asserted that
there was no European consensus on this issue. 77 The government
was supported by eight of the ten third-party intervening countries,
whose *counselthe Court did not permit to address the specifics of the
case but only the general principles concerned. 78 Because Weiler
addressed general themes and issues, the analogy in this Note to the
American context uses his perspective to consider how such ideas
might be applicable to American attempts to deal with the
constitutional relationship between the state and the church.
Weiler stated that the lower chamber had set forth three
principles, two of which the interveners affirmed, and the third, with
which the interveners strongly disagreed.7 9 The agreed-upon principles
were that individual freedom has both positive and negative aspects
and that classroom education should be directed toward tolerance and
pluralism.80 Weiler addressed the interveners' theory on the duty of
neutrality. 8 ' Weiler characterized the core societal strife exemplified
in this case as existing not between differing religious groups, but
between the religious and the nonreligious.8 2 This argument, featured
in the closing statements of his speech, is intriguing and serves to
83
characterize secularism in an entirely different light.
D. FurtherElaborationof Weiler's Arguments Based on
the Published Text of his Oral Submission
Weiler published the text of his oral submission in the
InternationalJournal of Constitutional Law in an editorial.8 4 Weiler
described what he believes are errors with respect to the concept of
neutrality in the initial Lautsi ruling.8 5 Related to the first error, he
explained that as the ECHR stands as a court which must assess the
diverse nations of Europe with all of their very different versions of

75.
Grand Chamber: Lautsi v. Italy No. (30814/06), supra note 23.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Joseph Weiler, State and Nation; Church, Mosque and Synagogue-The
Trailer, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 157, 160 (2010).
85.
Id. at 161-65.
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the relationship between the church and the state, pluralism and
tolerance should be the touchstone values to which the Court's
estimations should consistently return.8 6 By this, he means that the
Court should tolerate the various settlements that individual
countries have reached on this issue-allowing more or less
involvement between church and state as the individual states have
87
negotiated it, without finding violation of the Convention's values.
This first error represents a balance necessary in the ECHR's
decisions, but is not particularly relevant to the subsequent
examination of the values of secularism, neutrality, and pluralism in
the American context.88
The second error that Weiler found in the original Lautsi
decision is broader and particularly relevant in considering the
neutrality demands of the U.S. Constitution.8 9 A summary of Weiler's
understanding is that neutrality does not demand secularism because
secularism is itself a worldview that stands in competition with other
philosophical worldviews, including those that are religiously
guided.90 The crucial application of Weiler's insight, relevant in his
context and in the American one, is that secularism is not only a
worldview, but that it is a worldview which is nonneutral and which,
at its core, asserts a "conviction that religion only has a legitimate
place in the private sphere and that there may not be any
entanglement of public authority and religion." 91 Weiler claimed that
secularism is not a neutral position.9 2 This latter assertion is one that
the United States should explore in assessing its own view of the
neutrality that the Constitution demands of the state in respect to
religion. 93 Weiler argued in the ECHR context that forbidding "any
entanglement" is not a neutral, but a secular position. 9 4 In other
words, this language, which is strikingly similar to one prominent
First Amendment test for assessing whether the state has endorsed

Id. at 162.
86.
87.
See id. at 163 (claiming the Chamber's previous decision is "not an
expression of the pluralism manifest by the Convention system, but an expression of
the values of the laique [or secular] State").
88.
See infra Part II.E (discussing changes in application of the margin of
appreciation principle and analyzing the influence of values like neutrality).
89.
Weiler, supra note 84, at 163.
See id. at 164 (explaining that "[s]ecularity, Laicit6 is not an empty
90.
category which signifies absence of faith" but instead represents to many a "rich world
view").

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 164.
Id.
See infra Parts IV-V (analyzing neutrality in American jurisprudence).
Weiler, supra note 84, at 164.
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religion, is actually a test motivated by a secular worldview and not a
95
test that refuses to take sides on the question of religion.
E. A Narrow Critiqueof Lautsi: The Margin of AppreciationDoctrine
One line of critique in response to the original ECHR decision
involves the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine. 96 The
ECHR originally developed this doctrine in Handyside v. United
Kingdom. 97 In this case, the Court examined the United Kingdom's
prosecution of the applicant, under the Obscene Publications Act of
1959, amended in 1964, for the publication of The Little Red
Schoolbook.98 The applicant claimed that his rights under Articles 9
and 10 of the European Convention had been violated. 99 In this case,
the Court permitted the United Kingdom to make its own
determinations about issues such as morality within its sphere due to
the lack of European consensus on the issue and the need to respect
the country's sovereignty when this consensus is uncertain. 0 0 This
principle, the margin of appreciation doctrine, offers a partial
explanation for why the parties in Lautsi attempted to establish
whether there was a European consensus on the public display of
religious symbols. 01 ' Following the original ECHR judgment, parties
who favored Italy summoned this doctrine to argue for greater
deference to Italy to regulate its own relationship between church

95.
See infra Part 1V.B (discussing Supreme Court First Amendment cases,
including the Lemon v. Kurtzman and Lynch v. Donnelly tests for endorsement).
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 737 (1976).
96.
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 750.
100.
Id. The ECHR described why it would defer to countries even in the
application of the international European Convention:
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these
requirements as well as on the "necessity" of a "restriction" or "penalty"
[Ilt is for the national authorities to make the
intended to meet them ....
initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the
notion of "necessity" in this context.
Id. at 754.
See supra Part II.B-C (analyzing Lautsi, November 3, 2010 and Lautsi,
101.
June 30, 2010, and the question of European consensus).
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and state. 10 2 This principle was the cornerstone consideration in the
10 3
Grand Chamber's reversal of the earlier ruling.
Additionally, commentators evaluating the doctrine and the
Court's ruling have more broadly concluded that there are disturbing
inconsistencies in the way the Court has applied this doctrine,
particularly in the context of Article 9 jurisprudence. 10 4 According to
Carolyn Evans's assessment of the application of this doctrine in
other religious cases, "it is generally used as a rationale for deferring5
'10
to State decision-making in areas of controversy and complexity.
In the context of broader ECHR jurisprudence, the original Lautsi
decision appeared to have been a shift away from how the doctrine
had been applied previously, often in favor of state deference. 10 6 One
possible reason for this departure was the interpretation of neutrality
in Lautsi, as discussed by Weiler. 10 7 In the original Lautsi decision,
the Court only superficially nodded toward the pairing of religious
pluralism with neutrality.10 8 Malcolm Evans also viewed the original
Lautsi decision as a shift with respect to application of neutralityultimately, he forecasted, the Grand Chamber's decision would be
shaped by the decision of whether to follow a secularly inclined
neutrality that "speaks of a paranoia about religion and its
influence."' 09

102.

See, e.g., GREGOR PUPPINCK & KRIS J. WENBERG, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR LAW

& JUSTICE, ECHR-LAUTSI V. ITALY (2010), available at http://www.eclj.org/pdf/ECLJMEMO-LAUTSI-ITALY-ECHR-PUPPINCK.pdf (arguing that the Court in Lautsi erred
by failing to consider the proper margin of appreciation due Italy as a member state of
the Council of Europe and as a country with unique traditions and history).
103.
See infra Part II.F (discussing the ECHR Grand Chamber. ruling in Lautsi
of March 18, 2011).
104.
See, e.g., Carolyn Evans, Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the
European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture, 26 J.L. &
RELIGION 321, 332 ("Part of the reason for the different results between the headscarf
and registration cases [two groups of religious cases on which the ECHR often rules
against applicants who wish to wear headscarves but in favor of churches who
complain about restrictions on their registration] was that the test of necessity (by
which all restrictions on religious freedom are measured) was diluted by the margin of
appreciation in the headscarf cases.").
105.
Id.
106.
See Zachary R. Calo, Pluralism, Secularism and the European Court of
Human Rights, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 261, 265-66 (2010) (explaining that even if Lautsi
is similar to the headscarf cases on some levels, these cases differ from other previous
decisions applying the margin of appreciation).
. 107.
See supra Part II.D (discussing Weiler's argument that there are errors in
the concept of neutrality in the initial Lautsi ruling).
108.
See Calo, supra note 106, at 266 (concluding that this application of the
neutrality principle to deny religious display is dissimilar to the Court's previous
fostering of religious expression in the name of pluralism).
109.
Malcolm D. Evans, From Cartoons to Crucifixes: Current Controversies
Concerning the Freedom of Religion and the Freedom of Expression Before the European
Court of Human Rights, 26 J.L. & RELIGION

345, 360 (2010).

Evans concludes,

"Whether the Grand Chamber does reverse the Chamber's judgment may largely
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F. ECHR Grand Chamber Ruling in Lautsi, March 18, 2011
On March 18, 2011, the Grand Chamber announced its final
judgment in Lautsi.110 The Grand Chamber opted to sidestep parsing
the subtleties of neutrality and secularism, deciding the case
narrowly on the above-mentioned margin of appreciation doctrine,
stating that: "Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in
their efforts to reconcile exercise of the functions they assume in
relation to education and teaching with respect for the right of
parents to ensure such education and teaching is in conformity with
1
their own religious and philosophical convictions."11' The Grand
Chamber's long awaited decision was therefore a narrow reversal of
the prior ruling-a clear resolution that defers assessment of some of
the more contentious issues raised in the previous decision. Because
this Note seeks points of comparison between issues before the ECHR
and the Supreme Court and interpretations of broader and more
complex relations, the final ruling is less relevant than the original
ruling. The following critiques of ECHR religious jurisprudence
continue to provide parallels to the American situation even if they
did not ultimately prove decisive in the Lautsi case. Therefore, this
Note references the more comprehensive version of the issues in the
case prior to the final decision, as the margin of appreciation doctrine
has no true parallel in Supreme Court jurisprudence.

III. BROADER CRITIQUES OF ECHR RELIGIOUS JURISPRUDENCE
(ARTICLE 9): PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

Weiler's focus on the values of neutrality and secularism in the
Lautsi case fits into a broader discussion about ECHR
requirements. 112 Commentators have offered various views about
whether Article 9 neutrality involves a pluralism driven by
secularism or, instead, neutrality bolstered by a more full-blooded
pluralism, which, in effect, subordinates secularism to the position of
one among many competing views in a pluralistic society.113 These

depend on whether it is willing to depart from the dominant emphasis in its more
recent jurisprudence on State neutrality in matters of religion in general and in the
educational context in particular." Id. at 361.
Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2011).
110.

111.

Id.

16-18.

See supra Part II.C-D (discussing the ECHR Grand Chamber hearing in
112.
Lautsi, June 30, 2010, and Weiler's oral submission to the ECHR).
See infra Part III (discussing critiques of Article 9 and ECHR religious
113.
jurisprudence).
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critiques of the ECHR, often general in nature, are applicable to the
Lautsi situation, and the demand that neutrality be secular, is, in
accord with Weiler's arguments, ln 4 the most problematic aspect of the
original decision of the lower chamber. In the ECHR context,
arguments against the lower chamber ruling could be leveled through
the framework of the margin of appreciation doctrine, as it was in the
ultimate Grand Chamber ruling. n 5 However, the more basic
distinctions between the values of neutrality, pluralism, and
secularism serve as a link to the Supreme Court's efforts to apply the
neutrality mandate of the First Amendment to religious displays.
Prior to considering the nature of neutrality and pluralism, this
Note considers critiques that focus on the way the ECHR defines
religion itself, as these are analogously relevant in the American
context. Focusing on a slightly more basic concern about ECHR
understanding of religious freedom, Carolyn Evans grounded her
discussion of Article 9 of the European Convention in her observation
of the pervasiveness of the protection of the freedom of religion in
human rights treaties. n 6 To the extent that Article 9 is based on both
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as Evans contends, n 7 there is
a further connection to its principles in the American context because
the United States is a party to both treaties. n 8 The United States has
ratified relatively few human rights instruments, n 9 so its ratification
of these human rights treaties is significant. Therefore, while the
United States is in no way subject to the jurisdiction of the ECHR,
not being a member of its respective Convention, it has set forth its
agreement with similar objectives to those embodied by Article 9 and
applied in Lautsi. However, by discussing the public display of

114.
See supra Part II.C (discussing the arguments of both parties before the
Grand Chamber).
115.
See supra Part II.E (discussing application of margin of appreciation in
Lautsi).
116.
Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The
Search for a Guiding Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 387
(Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 2004).
Id. at 387 ("It seems, therefore, that the idea that all people have the right
117.
to freedom of religion or belief and the freedom to manifest that religion or belief (albeit
subject to limitations) has developed into an important part of the international human
rights corpus.").
118.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The United States signed the ICCPR on October 5,
1977, and ratified the treaty on June 8, 1992. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
119.
Even though the United States "played a leading part in the promulgation
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in converting the Declaration into
the two principal human rights covenants [one of which is the ICCPR]," it is a party to
"only a limited number of internal human rights agreements." HUMAN RIGHTS 956
(Louis Henkin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
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religious symbols in the United States, the Supreme Court directly
First Amendment, which also
interprets and applies only the
120
embodies a neutrality principle.
Evans's concern about ECHR jurisprudence on freedom of
religion additionally references another potential parallel to Supreme
Court jurisprudence. 121 Addressing the developing conception of the
nature of religion or belief, Evans cited then-Chief Justice Burger's
comment in Wisconsin v. Yoder that "belief and action cannot be
neatly confined in logic-tight compartments."'122 Further corroborating
the parallel to Supreme Court religious display cases, at this point in
the Yoder decision, Burger was referencing the Lemon v. Kurtzman
a significant,
decision of the previous year, 123 which established
1 24
though much critiqued religious display test.
Evans argues that the very nature of the way freedom of religion
is understood by the ECHR represents an outsider interpretation of
the freedom as extended by the Convention. 125 She describes this
tendency to interpret Article 9 with "primacy given to internal
conscience" as originating in the "liberal predisposition to divide the
private from the public" rather than being based in the text of Article
9.126 The original Lautsi decision, decided after Evans's articulation
of this flaw in the reasoning of other ECHR rulings, could be seen as
an application of such assumptions as Weiler explained in his
disagreement with the Lautsi Court's propensity to confine religion to
12 7
the private sphere.

See infra Parts IV-V (discussing American religious display cases and
120.
American application of the principle of neutrality).
See Evans, supra note 116, at 394-95 (discussing the view that one's
121.
religious and other beliefs are inevitably intertwined).
Id. at 394-95 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).
122.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612
123.
(1971)).
See McConnell, supra note 25, at 140-45 (discussing then-current
124.
Rehnquist Court's "dismantling of some of Lemon's mistakes").
See Evans, supra note 116, at 395 ("The emphasis given in the case law to
125.
the internal as the core meaning of religion is not necessarily consonant with the way
in which many religions would define themselves.").
Id. at 395. This characteristic division of the private (religious) sphere from
126.
public life captures the essence of the secularization of our society in the minds of many
religious scholars. See, e.g., D.A. CARSON, CHRIST AND CULTURE REVISITED 116 (2008)
("In more popular parlance ... all three words-'secular,' 'secularization,' and
'secularism'-have to do with the squeezing of the religious to the periphery of life.
More precisely, secularization is the process that progressively removes religion from
the public arena and reduces it to the private realm; secularism is the stance that
endorses and promotes such a process. Religion may be ever so important to the
individual, and few secular persons will object. But if religion makes any claims
regarding policy in the public arena, it is viewed as a threat, and intolerant as well.");
GUINNESS, supra note 2, at 148 (defining the terms similarly to Carson).
Weiler, supra note 84, at 164.
127.
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Susanna Mancini highlights an additional difficulty in state and
court attempts to make interpretive decisions about religion-such
efforts often lead to the association of a majority religion with positive
political virtues and of a minority religion with negative political
values. 128 She explains that her analysis is particularly relevant in
the ECHR context because the Court must be ever mindful to provide
a "balance between unity and diversity," due to the "deeply divergent
constitutional traditions" of the nations involved. 129 The latter
observation corroborates the prior assertion that Italy should have
based its argument for allowing the crucifix display on the margin of
appreciation doctrine, which is often the Court's best option for
striking this essential balance. 130 The Grand Chamber decision
31
clearly focused on this principle in issuing its judgment.
Exemplifying the previously referenced tension between the
nature of neutrality and pluralism, Zachary Calo and Mancini
represent alternate positions in this debate. Calo's discussion
comments on ECHR jurisprudence as a whole, but he views the
original Lautsi opinion as symptomatic of an unfortunate
shortchanging of the value of pluralism toward which the Court ought
to aim its decisions. 132 Calo aligns with Evans and Weiler in that he
articulates a concern that a step away from pluralism by the Court
would be a step toward the imposition of "secular logic," which, in his
thesis, is not neutral. 133 Calo's pluralism-as-centerpiece-value
argument begins with the assertion that Article 9 itself focuses on
pluralism, as the ECHR confirmed in its first religious freedom
decision, Kokkinakis v. Greece. 1 34 However, pluralism is a doublejointed value, as it should be both the means by which the Court
interprets Article 9 and the end at which it aims by guaranteeing

128.
See Susanna Mancini, The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power:
Secularism and Religion as Guarantorsof Cultural Convergence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
2629, 2631 (2009) ("The practical result of this attitude is that crucifixes may be
displayed in the public schools because secularized Christianity represents a structural
element of the western constitutional identity, while the wearing of Islamic symbols is
either banned or restricted because it represents values and practices that are cast as
illiberal and undemocratic.").
Id.
129.
130.
See supra Part I.E-F (discussing margin of appreciation principle in
Lautsi).
131.
See supraPart I.F (discussing the Grand Chamber decision).
132.
See, e.g., Calo, supra note 106, at 265-66 (describing the way the Lautsi
decision abandons the prior efforts by the Court to endorse "religious pluralism" as "a
normative good for democratic life and culture").
See id. at 268 (expressing the thesis that, in the context of Article 9
133.
decisions, "[w]hile no single factor can fully account for the Court's Article 9
decisions ... the Court's commitment to a mode of secular logic has been particularly
important in limiting its ability to render decisions consistent with the principle of
normative religious pluralism").
Id. at 261-62.
134.
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religious freedom.1 35 While departing from Mancini in his conclusions,
he does agree with her 1 36 and with Evans, 137 in the attention he
draws to the uniform result in headscarf cases. 138 However, for Calo,
the original Lautsi decision represented a potential expansion of the
demise of pluralism-guided jurisprudence. 139 Calo significantly notes
that the sleight of hand in the first Lautsi judgment, whereby the
Court verbally acknowledged pluralism without applying a fulLorbed
version, involved the demand that pluralism be neutral. 140 However,
even though he labels this a problem of identifying plurality with
neutrality, his true critique is of the Court's version of neutrality, "not
presented as the equal right to public religious expression but rather
a public space free from the impositions of religion."'14 1 He explains
the deeply flawed end result of defining pluralism through a secularly
guided structure: the application of such a principle, by definition,
142
inevitably limits public religious expression.
The solution he offers allows both religious and nonreligious
traditions to contribute to the articulation of human rights values, in
effect providing pluralism as the engine that drives the application of
14 3
Article 9, rather than secularism or secularly laden neutrality.
Calo clearly acknowledges that he has only dealt with one potential
application of the principles he discussed-religious jurisprudence in
the ECHR-and he notes but does not develop broader
44
applicability. 1

135.
See id. at 262 ("Pluralism is both the means and the end of fostering
genuine religious freedom.").
136.
See supranotes 128-29 and accompanying text.
137.
See Evans, supra note 104, at 322 (noting the disparity between the Court's
tendency to rule in favor of religion in group cases, but against religion in individual
cases, establishing a seeming bias against individuals with many of these up to this
point being Muslim applicants, questioning headscarf restrictions).
138.
Calo, supra note 106, at 264.
139.
See id. at 265-66 (contrasting headscarf and Lautsi approach of
"associat[ing] democratic pluralism with the circumscription of public religious
expression" with the Kokkiaakis v. Greece approach of "endors[ing] ... religious
pluralism as a normative good for democratic life and culture").
140.
Id.
141.
Id. at 266.
142.
See id. (explaining how the Court connects "democratic pluralism with the
circumscription of public religious expression").
143.
See id. at 277 (expressing a belief that the "idea of human rights" should
allow "theological rationalities" to speak into the "inheritance of the modern tradition
by collapsing the distinctions between reason and faith, secular and sacred, public and
private").
144.
Id. at 278 ("While this paper has focused on the religious freedom
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, it also illuminates broader
challenges confronting modern legal thought.... This paper has thus proposed
pluralization, in particular by opening the idea of human rights to theological
perspectives, as one way to overcome the limitations of the secular tradition.").
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Mancini's position explores the converse preference for
secularism as the touchstone value: "Secularism is a crucial
145
precondition for guaranteeing religious and cultural pluralism."
Mancini usefully explores the absurdity of Italy's attempt to argue
that the crucifix is itself secular. 14 6 The lack of respect for the
argument that religious symbols are really secular or bearers of
secular meaning is remarkable considering the frequency with which
this very argument is employed by the Supreme Court in its
interpretation of constitutionally mandated neutrality as applied to
religious symbols. 14 7 Mancini alludes to this irony, citing Stone v.
148
Graham, as a "similar attempt to 'secularize' a religious symbol."'
However, though this attempt failed in Stone, it resurfaced in Salazar
and in the intervening cases that consider the public display of
religious symbols. 149 Mancini and Calo offer contrasting alternativesthis Note argues that Calo's alternative is preferable because, by its
nature, secularism is itself a system of values and incapable of
serving as a neutral arbiter for the purpose of achieving true religious
pluralism, either in the ECHR or Supreme Court context.
Mancini, while opting for the converse of the approach preferred
here does, however, provide a final insight with which most sides of
the pluralism debate must wrestle. She asks a provocative question:
Are judges the proper interpreters of the nature of religious symbols
and the values they evoke? 150 Her question at this point is one that
applies to both the Supreme Court and the ECHR. Perhaps this
question is even more relevant in the American context where the
Supreme Court does not have a deferential option equivalent to the
one used by the ECHR when it applied the margin of appreciation
doctrine in the final Lautsi decision. The controversy sparked by the
original Lautsi decision, before the issues were narrowed in the final

145.
Mancini, supranote 46, at 195.
146.
See id. at 185 (demonstrating the illogical nature of Italy's attempt to
preserve the crucifixes as secular symbols by sarcastically characterizing the position:
"Therefore it would be a paradox to exclude a Christian symbol from the public domain
in the nature of a principle such as secularism, which is actually rooted in the
Christian religion."). *
147.
See infra Part IV (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of secular
purpose arguments in religious display cases).
148.
Mancini, supra note 46, at 188.
149.
See infra Part IV (discussing secularization arguments in Salazar).
150.
Mancini, supra note 46, at 186 (presenting the issue as "to what extent
judges are legitimized to define the significance of religious symbols in order to rule on
their compatibility with the values which constitute the core of a secular state"); see
also Joseph Blocher, Schr6dinger's Cross: The Quantum Mechanics of the
Establishment Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 51, 55 (2010) ("What reality exists before
judges render judgment? ... These questions implicitly arise in Establishment Clause
cases regarding government involvement with religious iconography.... But what is
the status of the iconography before judges make their observation? And why should it
be the judges' observation that counts?").
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judgment, raised questions that the Supreme Court is unable to avoid
by any applicable narrowing doctrine.

IV.AMERICAN ANALOGUES: RELIGIOUS DISPLAY IN SALAZAR
PREDECESSORS

AND ITS

A. Comparisonof the Texts: Article 9 of the European Convention
and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
The Supreme Court's religious public display cases form an
interpretive line of assessment rooted in the First Amendment decree
that, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 151 Clearly, this
description of the relationship between the government and religion
is far less specific than that set forth in the European Convention,
which guarantees the rights of "[f]reedom of thought, conscience, and
religion."'1 52 The language in the European Convention focuses on the
rights and privileges of individuals, without directly describing the
relationship between the individual and the state. 153 The protections
described in Article 9(1)-providing basic rights to religious belief and
practice, including the right to practice in public or private154-are
roughly analogous to the American concept of free exercise. 15 5 Article
9(2) provides a closer parallel to the American constitutional
description of the state's role in religion.' 5 6 However, even Article 9(2)
uses the language of "[f]reedom to manifest one's religion,"' 57 only
reaching the role of the state and its laws by confining the state's
158
ability to regulate religious practice and belief.
The European Convention naturally does not contain language
similar to that of the Establishment Clause. Article 9(2) decrees that
public manifestation of religion and beliefs can be legally limited only
when "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.' 5 9 The text does not

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
151.
152.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 15, art. 9.
153.
Id.
Id. art. 9(1).
154.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
155.
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....).
156.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 15, art. 9(2).
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
Id.
159.
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state that the member states must be neutral toward religion. The
ECHR originally described how Article 9 affected Ms. Lautsi's case,
immediately after explaining that this article guarantees parents and
children freedom of belief or unbelief. 160 The Court proceeded to
elaborate on the state's role in response to this freedom: "The State's
duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any kind of
power on its part to assess the legitimacy of religious convictions or
the ways of expressing those convictions."' 16 1 It is precisely this
statement that Weiler claimed was an incorrect gloss on Article 9,162
based on two assumptions he disputed: 63 first, that neutrality
uniformly characterizes the member states' understanding of
government-religion relations and,164 second, the "conflation, pragmatic
and conceptual, between secularism, laicite, and neutrality."'1 65 In
short, Weiler believes pluralism and tolerance do not require the
166
state to remain utterly neutral in matters of religion.
This Note does not intend to stretch the analogy between the
ECHR's application of the neutrality principle and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause in public religious
display cases beyond reasonable bounds. European states have
varying understandings of the relationship between church and
state-separation is often less rigid in Europe, sometimes more
rigid. 167 However, on this particular issue, the Supreme Court
continues to wrestle with whether the Establishment Clause
demands neutrality, rather than a softer, more inclusive pluralism,
and if it demands neutrality, how rigidly this demand should be
enforced. 168 The United States formally accepts language similar to
the European Convention as not incompatible with its own concept of
the respective spheres of the state and religion. 169 But the true
rationale for comparing the treatment of religious public display
cases between the two courts is the way in which both struggle with
whether statements about pluralism, or even neutrality, can be
falsely tinted by the dye of secularism to such an extent that religion,

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Lautsi v. Italy, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 42, . 47 (2009).
Id. (emphasis added).
Weiler, supra note 84, at 161.
See supra Part II.C-D (analyzing Weiler's arguments in Lautsi).
Weiler, supra note 84, at 161-62.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 163.

167.
See generally SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN EUROPE: WITH VIEWS
ON SWEDEN, NORWAY, THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, FRANCE, SPAIN, ITALY, SLOVENIA,

AND GREECE (Fleur de Beaufort et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the different ways in
which the separation of church and state has developed in various European contexts).
168.
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the Court's arguments for plurality and
neutrality and the tension between the two).
169.
See supra Part III (discussing various responses to European religious
jurisprudence).
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though protected in both governing
disadvantaged in the public sphere.

documents,

is

actually

B. Supreme Court PrecedentsAssessing the Constitutionality
of Public Religious Displays
Just as the Lautsi case, particularly in the original ruling,
represents a recent struggle to consider neutrality, pluralism, and
their implications in a specific application, the Salazar case
represents a similar struggle by the Supreme Court. In the narrow
context of religious displays in public schools, the Court concluded in
Stone v. Graham that a Kentucky statute that required all public
school classrooms to post a copy of the Ten Commandments, though
paid for with private funds, was unconstitutional. 170 The Court
assessed the statute's constitutionality under the three-part Lemon
test, which requires a "secular legislative purpose," a "principal or
primary effect" that "neither advances nor inhibits religion," and that
the statute "not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' 171 In particular, the Court held that the statute did not
have a secular purpose, 172 and Rehnquist's dissent takes issue with
the Court's haste in not analyzing whether the statute did in fact
serve some additional secular purpose. 1 73 It is apparent from the
summary disposition of this case that the Court did not believe it
raised difficult constitutional questions, but it would be incorrect to
assume that religious public displays in other settings have been
dismissed as quickly.
The line of cases that deals more broadly with public religious
displays raises questions very similar to those in Lautsi. The
Supreme Court has wrestled with the implications of the First
Amendment's joint requirements of neither favoring religion nor
stifling its practice, and like the ECHR, it has often been forced to
decide, as the Lemon test indicates, whether religious symbols have
secular purposes. 174 The Lemon test is not always applied with the
same rigor in Establishment Clause cases, as is clear from the Court's
application to public religious displays in other contexts. 175 Not only
is the application of the Lemon test now uncertain, but even the

170.
449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980).
171.
Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
172.
Id. at 41.
173.
Id. at 43-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174.
Id. at 40 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
175.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1319 (Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther
eds., 17th ed. 2010) (explaining that while the Lemon test has not been repudiated, it
has been criticized and relied upon with much less frequency in recent cases).
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subsequent endorsement test, as an interpretation of the Lemon test,
176
appears to be on shakier ground.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Salazar v. Buono did not
actually reach the issue of whether the Latin cross on Sunrise Rock in
177
the Mojave National Preserve violated the Establishment Clause.
To address the Court's wavering response to the religious display in
this case, it is necessary to consider allusions to the merits of the
Establishment Clause question in the context of the Court's line of
rulings about public religious displays: Lynch v. Donnelly, 178
Allegheny v. ACLU,1 79 Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v.
82
Pinette,180 McCreary v. ACLU,' 8 1 and Van Orden v. Perry.1
The
discussion of these cases, instead of dealing with their most
prominent arguments, is an attempt to read the majority, plurality,
concurring, and dissenting opinions for insights as to what the
Justices think about the interpretation of religious symbols, whether
neutrality (or merely plurality) is mandated by the Establishment
Clause, and, if so, how this mandate influences interpretations of the
symbols themselves. This wrestling to conform the religious to the
strictures of absolute neutrality, or neutrality with a secular bent,
ties the issues in these cases to the issues in Lautsi. Stanley Fish has
provocatively suggested that Salazar, as the "latest chapter of this
odd project of saving religion by emptying it of its content" forces the
Court into the awkward position of "sav[ing] the symbols by leeching
the life out of them.' 18 3 Fish alludes to one of the most dangerous
consequences of jurisprudence that implies secularism as a gloss on
pluralistic neutrality-the state's neutrality is slanted by a bias
against religion through a perverse tendency to misinterpret its
symbols.' 8 4 These symbols may remain only if they claim to be their
85
own antithesis-secular.
In Lynch, the Court held that the display of a cr6che in the City
of Pawtucket's Christmas display, on public grounds and amidst
other holiday decorations, was not a violation of the Establishment
Clause. 8 6 The majority opinion used language that interpreted the

176.
See supra Part IV.B (discussing application and interpretation of the
Lemon test).
177.
See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1813 (2010) (stating that a final
decision, not appealed, had already been reached on this issue by the lower court).
178.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
179.
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
180.
Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
181.
McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
182.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
183.
Stanley Fish, When Isa Cross a Cross?, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2010, 9:00 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/when-is-a-cross-a-cross.
184.

Id.

185.
186.

Id.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1984).
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Establishment Clause in terms of plurality and accommodation
rather than of neutrality,187 calling an approach that would
"invalidat[e] all governmental conduct or statutes that ... give
special recognition to religion" "absolutist." 188 Even without
demanding government neutrality to religion, and expressing
skepticism about the rigidity of the Lemon test, 8 9 Justice Burger was
still intent on finding a secular purpose in the creche, 190 a "passive
symbol."19 1 Lynch, however, is perhaps more significant for Justice
O'Connor's test for evaluating whether a religious display should be
considered government "endorsement." This test provides substance
for the first two Lemon prongs, questioning under the purpose prong,
"whether the government intends to convey a message of
endorsement or disapproval of religion,"1192 and requiring under the
effect prong that "a government practice does not have the effect of
communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval
'193
of religion.
Justice Blackmun's dissent in this case struck at the true effect
of the opinion; he said that it claimed plurality, but edged toward
secularly influenced neutrality by requiring secular purpose. 194
Admittedly, neutralizing or misusing religious symbols would not
precisely qualify as showing government disapproval, which
O'Connor's twin prohibitions would vitiate against. Yet, the majority
opinion seemed to be speaking about a test that would permit
plurality and require a version of neutrality that would leave the
creche, but only as long as its message is not precisely and exclusively
religious.1 95 This result of requiring neutrality instead of mere
plurality serves as a theme to which the Court returns at many
points in the subsequent cases. 19 6 The question in these cases relates

187.
Id. at 678 ("[Iln our modern, complex society, whose traditions and
constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all
areas, an absolutist approach in applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic and
has been uniformly rejected by the Court." (emphasis added)).
188.
Id.
189.
See id. at 679 (noting that the Lemon test is not sufficient to provide a
simple rule for assessing all public display cases).
190.
See id. at 680-81 (addressing the distinction between being exclusively
secular and having some secular purpose, concluding that the latter is sufficient to
avoid violation of the Establishment Clause).
191.
Id. at 686.
192.
Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
193.
Id. at 692.
194.
See id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The creche has been relegated to
the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season .... The city has its victory-but
it is a Pyrrhic one indeed.... Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred symbol.").
195.
See id. at 678-80 (majority opinion) (rejecting a hard line test and
emphasizing that each case will depend on context).
196.
See infra Part IV (discussing Allegheny, Capital Square Review, McCreary,
Van Orden, and ultimately, Salazar).
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to whether the nature of the supposed neutrality actually contradicts
197
its own mandate.
Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court in Allegheny, and a
majority of the Justices joined him in accepting O'Connor's
endorsement test from her concurrence in Lynch as an appropriate
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 198 This case considered
two different religious holiday displays, a creche within the Allegheny
County courthouse 19 9 and a display at the City-County Building,
which included both a Christmas tree and Jewish Menorah.20 0 The
Court held that the cr~che was unconstitutional, 20 1 but that the joint
20 2
Christmas tree and Menorah display was constitutional.
This case is additionally pertinent to this discussion of possible
interpretations of the Establishment Clause that would not demand
strict neutrality because, in dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, described an
alternative test. 20 3 These Justices believed that the endorsement test
is not a fair characterization of the Establishment Clause because it
is not neutral in respect to religion and it expresses "an unjustified
hostility toward religion." 204 Here, the concept of neutrality is
considered from religion's perspective-"neutrality" is slanted against
religious messages. Establishment of religion should, under this
reading of the Constitution, be defined as government coercion in
support of religious ideas or exercise, by giving particular benefits to
20 5
religion as opposed to irreligion, or by establishing a state church.
This test would be conducive to promoting pluralism, allowing for
"flexible accommodation" or "passive acknowledgement" of at least
some religious symbols. 20 6 This coercion or accommodation test would
be tied in part to "practices that are accepted in our national
heritage," 20 7 but it does not appear to unnecessarily bind religious
symbols with the straitjacket of rigid government neutrality nor does
it deprive them of their core emphases.

197.
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 ("In a pluralistic society a variety of motives and
purposes are implicated.").
198.
See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) ("The Establishment
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person's standing in the political community."' (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687
(O'Connor, J., concurring))).
199.
Id. at 579.
200.
Id. at 584.
201.
Id. at 612-23.
202.
Id. at 619-20.
203.
Id. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
204.
Id. at 655.
205.
Id. at 662-63.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
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Capital Square Review permitted a Latin cross in a public forum;
this cross was not a government display, but was instead a private
expressive symbol in a public forum. 20 8 But, more recently in this line
of cases, the Court reached seemingly opposite conclusions in
McCreary and Van Orden, decided on the same day. Both cases
involved displays of the Ten Commandments, which the Court had
considered unconstitutional in public school classrooms in Stone.20 9 In
McCreary, the Court considered several different attempts to display
the Ten Commandments, culminating in the Foundations of
American Law and Government exhibit in a county courthouse that
the Court found to be an unconstitutional violation of the "neutrality
principle." 210 The dissent narrowly interpreted the Establishment
Clause's prohibitions on the government's acknowledgment of
religion, labeled the idea that "government cannot favor religion over
irreligion" a "demonstrably false principle," and disagreed with the
idea that the Ten Commandments display actually violated this
principle. 2 11 Yet, despite rejecting the neutrality principle, as
interpreted by the majority, 212 the belief in a secular purpose behind
213
the display was nevertheless central to the dissent's conclusion.
Van Orden, McCreary's foil, concluded that a different type of
Ten Commandments display, on the Texas State Capitol grounds
amongst other monuments, was constitutional. 214 Four Justices
joined not only the result in this case, but Rehnquist's argument,
which included the following assessment of the Ten Commandments
and the symbolic display at issue: "the Ten Commandments are
religious-they were so viewed at their inception and so remain. The
monument, therefore, has religious significance. ' 215 More broadly,
Rehnquist described the Establishment Clause in terms that hardly
even hinted at the neutrality that the Court has embraced at times:
"Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent
with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment
Clause." 2 16 He argued that there is no attempt to demand that a
secular message predominate. 217 The Ten Commandments were

208. - See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770
(1995) (holding that the Establishment Clause is not violated by religious expression
that is undertaken by a private party in a designated public forum).
209.
See infra Part IV.B (discussing McCreary and Van Orden).
210.
McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005).
211.
Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212.
Id. at 876 (majority opinion).
213.
See id. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the need for the Court to
maintain the support of the people and discussing the difference between
acknowledgement and establishment).
214.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005).
215.
Id. at 690.
216.
Id.
217.
Id.

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 45:841

permitted to remain, and to remain in robust possession of their true
symbolic and religious message. 218 Concurring in the result, Breyer
presents the alternative
rationale for allowing the Ten
Commandments display to remain-because they do, in fact, also
contain a secular and historical message. 2 19 The dissent commended
the plurality for the absence of any "attempt to minimize the religious
significance of the Ten Commandments, ' 220 and set forth the
neutrality principle with a similar sterling clarity, but with the
opposite interpretation of the Establishment Clause as the plurality,
claiming that the United States has demonstrated a "resolute
221
commitment to neutrality with respect to religion."
The dichotomy between the alternative interpretations of this
crucial clause could hardly be further apart occupying opposing ends
of the spectrum. Neither of these two sides sought to diminish the
religious content of the display even though it might be condoned as
an ambivalent message of national solidarity and historical
significance. Both sides believe the display is religious-the plurality
advocated for an Establishment Clause that accepts a plurality of
messages to be publicly displayed on government property, and the
dissent rejects this interpretation in favor of an Establishment
Clause that remains ostensibly neutral with respect to religious
messages.
C. The Salazar Decision
The recent decision in Salazar v. Buono ultimately did not
require the Supreme Court to consider whether the Latin cross on
Sunrise Rock violated the Establishment Clause. 222 The litigation
leading up to the Court's verdict traces a fairly complex set of appeals
and statutory responses. 2 23 The case before the Supreme Court posed
additional questions about the plaintiffs standing and about the
government's attempt to transfer the publicly owned plot of land on
which the cross stood to the VFW, who had erected the initial
cross. 2 2 4 In an ironic turn of events, the cross itself mysteriously
disappeared in May, ten days after the Court's ruling. 22 5 Lawyers on
both sides of the case indicated that they believed the cross's
disappearance was related to the Court's decision, which remanded

218.
Id.
219. Id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring).
220.
Id. at 716 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221.
Id. at 712.
222.
130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820-21 (2010).
223. Id. at 1808.
224. Id. at 1807-08.
225.
Randal C. Archibold, Cross at Center of Legal Dispute Disappears, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A15.
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the case to the lower court and allowed the cross to remain, at least
temporarily. 226 However, some commentators believed that the
interesting legal issues in the case had disappeared by the time oral
arguments before the Court had concluded. 227 From the standpoint of
clarifying Establishment Clause jurisprudence and determining
whether land transfer can cure a violation, the Salazar decision is not
satisfying. But its plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions
indicate that the Court continues to struggle with the ramifications of
allowing or prohibiting public display of religious symbols, including
the question of whether or not to insist that these displays offend the
228
perennial specter of the neutrality principle.
The Court was technically not able to decide whether the cross
violated the Establishment Clause because this issue had already
been resolved in the lower courts and not appealed. 229 Frank Buono,
respondent before the Supreme Court, a retired employee of the park
who visited the preserve on a regular basis, initially filed his case
claiming that the cross, a religious symbol standing on federal land,
violated the Establishment Clause. 230 In the first stage of the case in
2002 (Buono 1), the district court found that cross violated the
Establishment Clause by applying the reasonable observer test,
concluded that the cross was a government endorsement of religion,
and issued a permanent injunction forbidding the display of the
cross. 23 1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion
(Buono II).232 The government did not appeal this decision, which
became final. 233 However, prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision,
Congress passed several statutes affecting the display and the land in
question. 234 While Buono I was pending before the district court, the
cross and the land on which it stood were named a national war
memorial in honor of World War I, reflecting the purpose of its initial

226.
227.

Id.
See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Analysis: A Case of DisappearingIssues, SCOTUS

BLOG (Oct. 7, 2009, 1:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/10/analysis-a-case-of-

disappearing-issues (noting that many of the Justices considered other factors other
than the constitutionality of the cross's display the determinative factors in this case).
228.
See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing application of neutrality
principle and tension between neutrality and plurality).
229.
See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1813 (2010) (explaining why the
lower court ruling on Establishment Clause violation became final since the
Government did not appeal this decision).
230.
Id. at 1812.
231.
Id. (citing Buono v. Norton (Buono 1), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1216-17 (C.D.
Cal. 2002)).
Id. at 1813 (citing Buono v. Norton (Buono 11), 371 F.3d 543, 549-50 (9th
232.
Cir. 2004)).
233.
Id.
234.
Id. (citing Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations for Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United
States Act, 2002, Pub. L. 107-117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278).
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installment. 235 While Buono H was pending before the Ninth Circuit,
Congress passed a land transfer statute whereby the government
exchanged the land on which the cross stood in exchange for another
thus transferring this plot to the
portion of land in the preserve,
2 36
private ownership of the VFW.
Next, Buono took his case back to the district court, this time
only for the limited issue of whether the land transfer complied with
the 2002 injunction; the district court concluded that it was not valid
and permanently enjoined the government from implementing this
statute (2005 injunction). 237 The Ninth Circuit affirmed 238 and denied
the government's motion for rehearing en banc. 239 The Supreme
Court issued a divided decision and ultimately did not provide a
definitive answer as to whether the land transfer would cure the
constitutional problem, even though commentators had hoped the
240
Court would cast light on this difficult problem.
In comparing the issue of religious display in this case with that
in Lautsi, the land transfer is not the relevant issue. More intriguing
for present purposes was the propensity of the opinions to veer into a
discussion of the merits of the status of the Sunrise Rock cross under
the Establishment Clause, even though these statements are dicta
with no bearing on the resolution of the case. For the purposes of
analyzing the difficulties of forcing neutrality and pluralism to
adhere to a secularism limitation, allusions to the future fate of the
proper test for applying the Establishment Clause are relevant. First,
in his Salazar opinion, Justice Kennedy turned to the original
Establishment Clause violation, noting that the Court's current
decision should not be read as affirming the lower courts'
interpretation and application of the Clause to the Sunrise Rock
cross, even though the Court could not legally decide an issue that
had not been appealed. 24 1 Kennedy did not appear to interpret the
Establishment Clause as requiring absolute neutrality on the part of

235.
Id.
236.
Id. (citing Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 10887, § 1821(a), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100).
237.
Id. at 1813-14 (citing Buono v. Norton (Buono I11), 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175,
1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
238.
Id. at 1814 (citing Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono V), 502 F.3d 1069, 1086
(9th Cir. 2007)).
239.
Id. (citing Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758, 783 (9th Cir.
2008)).
240.
See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Intriguing Issues About Religion,
SCOTUS BLOG (Feb. 23, 2009, 5:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com2009/02/analysisintriguing-issues-about-religion (discussing how the Court could end the controversy
over the cross at issue in Salazar).
241.
Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1818 ("Although, for purposes of the opinion, the
propriety of the 2002 injunction may be assumed, the following discussion should not
be read to suggest this Court's agreement with that judgment, some aspects of which
may be questionable.").

2012]

SECULAR CROSSES AND THE NEUTRALITY OF SECULARISM

873

the government with respect to religion: "The goal of avoiding
governmental endorsement does not require eradication of all
religious symbols in the public realm. ' 242 Kennedy's preference for
accommodation of "divergent values"' 24 3 seems to conform with
Weiler's preference for demanding plurality instead of neutrality as a
better framework for approaching the cross display discussion before
the ECHR, a requirement more conducive to guaranteeing freedom of
expression for parties of varying religious and nonreligious
244
persuasions.
Another avenue for comparing the discussion of this cross with
the cross in the Lautsi case relates to the potential effect of provoking
a negative bias toward religion by demanding neutrality. In his oral
submission before the ECHR, Weiler illustrated the message of a
"state-mandated naked wall" with a fictional story of two boys, one
from a religious and one from a nonreligious home, who attend school
under two separate scenarios-either they see a crucifix on the wall
or they see a blank wall. 245 The point of his fictional elaboration is to
provide substance to the bones of the true outcome of neutrality-in
reality the state's removal of religious symbols also carries a message,
24 6
one that is not ambivalent with respect to religion and nonreligion.
Kennedy made a similar point in his Salazar plurality opinion, in
reference to the government's attempt to cure the possible
247
violation.
Perhaps Kennedy alluded to the appropriateness of finding
secular meaning in religious symbols; 248 however, the concept of
accommodation is certainly present in his brief statements about
analyzing this cross under the Establishment Clause. 249 The dissent
also touched on the merits of the Establishment Clause challenge,
labeling Kennedy's description of the cross's complexity, "a revealing
turn of phrase." 250 Without precisely taking up the neutrality
demand, Justice Stevens in dissent vigorously disagreed with any
attempt to permit the cross based on multifarious interpretations of

242.
Id. (emphasis added).
243.
See id. at 1818-19 ("The Constitution does not oblige government to avoid
any public acknowledgement of religion's role in society .... Rather, it leaves room to
accommodate divergent values within a constitutionally permissible framework.").
.244.
See supra Part II.C-D.
245.
Weiler, supra note 84, at 164-65.
246.
Id.
247.
See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1809, 1817 ("[The Government] could not
maintain the cross without violating the injunction, but it could not remove the cross
without conveying disrespect for those the cross was seen as honoring.").
248.
See id. at 1818 (noting that the cross has "complex meaning beyond the
expression of religious views").
249.
See id. (seeming to approve of Congress's land transfer response as one
allowing for the accommodation of a religious symbol).
250.
Id. at 1835 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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its symbolic nature. 25 1 Even in this case, in which the issue of an
Establishment Clause violation was not actually before the Court, the
subtle but important distinctions between an Establishment Clause
that demands neutrality and one which allows for the subsistence of a
plurality of messages-including religious messages-is apparent.
Scholars believe the Court has turned a conservative corner in
Establishment Clause assessment, 25 2 and this may be true, as can be
seen from the retrenchment and from accompanying uncertainty as
expressed by recent opinions considering religious displays. However,
these cases ultimately substantiate the reality that the Lautsi case
illustrates-the demand for neutrality in conjunction with the
attempt to allow for religious symbols by focusing on their secular
messages is ultimately not a solution that is actually neutral with
respect to religion.

V. FURTHER DISCUSSION OF PLURALISM, NEUTRALITY,
AND SECULARISM IN THE AMERICAN CONTEXT

The Salazar case was symptomatic of the Court's current
approach to the interpretation and application of the Establishment
Clause to religious display cases. Even if the Court did not reach
certain substantive challenges, scholars have understood the
tendencies expressed as emblematic of prominent themes in current
jurisprudence, such as deference to the government and a slant
toward conservative values and majoritarian religion. 253 Assessments
of Salazar in the immediate aftermath agreed that the case did not
abandon the endorsement test, but viewed this decision as an
indication .that the test may see future alterations, including
potential applications that might even allow cures as attempted by
254
the legislation pertaining to the cross.
Based on two different rationales, five of the Justices thought
that the federal judge below erred in barring the congressionally

251.
Id. at 1836 & n.8 ("The cross is not a universal symbol of sacrifice. It is the
symbol of one particular sacrifice .... ").
252.
See infra Part V (discussing Supreme Court precedent relating to the
Establishment Clause).
253.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 625-42 (assessing the direction of the
Roberts Court based on decisions such as Salazar and PleasantGrove v. Summum, 555
U.S. 460 (2009)).
254.
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Leading Cases I: Establishment
Clause: Endorsement Test, 124 HARV. L. REV. 219, 219, 225 (2010) (noting that the
majority of the Justices indicated that they would not apply the endorsement test to
this case and that the "plurality and concurring opinions portend a shift toward a more
formalistic endorsement test that is grounded in distinctions between public and
private action").
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ordered land transfer. 255 Some commentators, speaking less to the
future of the endorsement test, have viewed Salazar as another case
that demonstrates the lack of present clarity and the need for a more
certain measuring rod for interpreting and applying the
Establishment Clause. 256 At the very least, these responses suggesting
that this case is an instance of Supreme Court Establishment Clause
interpretation, as well as the diversity of views expressed in this case
and the line of predecessor public religious display cases, provide
evidence that Weiler's statements in his oral presentation in Lautsi,
257
while prescient as to the outcome of wrongly applying neutrality,
were too hasty in his account of the certainty of the strictly secular
258
requirement of the Establishment Clause.
Scholars have naturally previously quibbled with the
endorsement test;2 59 however, comparing Salazar and its predecessors
with the original Lautsi decision sheds light on why the endorsement
test in particular and secular-tending neutrality tests in general pose
distinct disadvantages and actually run contrary to an open
pluralism that permits both religious and nonreligious expression,
even on public property. U.S. commentators have also noted such
problems with a secular Establishment Clause, often as a result of
tests like the endorsement test.260 For example, without attempting
to provide an alternative solution, Ian Bartrum contends that Salazar
raises several interesting questions, including, as previously
referenced, that of the endorsement test's future. 261 But, his concerns
are also similar to those of the original Lautsi decision's opponents-

255.
Jeffrey Catalano & Bret Brintzenhofe, Supreme Court Year in Review, 57
FED. L. 42, 42 (2010).
256.
See John P. Elwood, What Were They Thinking, 14 GREEN BAG 31, 42-43
(2010) ("[N]one of the opinions in the case did anything material to resolve enduring
uncertainty about the role of the 'endorsement test' for the validity of government
speech under the Establishment Clause.").
257.
Weiler, supra note 84, at 163.
Id. at 164-65. Contra Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism
258.
and the Secular State, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 31, 33 (2010) (founding his
disagreement with the endorsement test itself on the fact that it too closely resembles
the absolute secularism of some European countries, such as France: "The secular state
view of disestablishment, which underlies the endorsement test, recalls the French
doctrine of laicit6: the state should remain totally neutral on religious questions and
should do so by setting aside all religion and religious reasoning in favor of secular
rationales and policies.").
259.
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 25, at 134-35 (discussing the then
emerging jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court as a counter to prior Lemon test-and
endorsement test-influenced decisions which expressed hostility and at best,
indifference toward religion); see also KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 87-90 (2008) (arguing from a different perspective than McConnell,
cataloguing the various problems and questions related to the current endorsement
test and its application).
260.
Bartrum, supra note 258, at 41.
261.
Id. at 31-33.
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the potential for a secularly swayed neutrality test to strip religious
symbols of their meaning. 262 Particular to the American context, he
suggests that wrongly interpreting the Establishment Clause in this
way is itself a significant detriment that robs the text of its true
meaning and application. 26 3 Ultimately, when a standard that might
require only plurality actually requires secularism, there are two
likely interpretations of this conclusion: either the Court as
interpreter is actually actively working to undermine religion or the
Court is simply acknowledging that when religious symbols have
association with the government, over time, they become relatively
meaningless. 26 4 The latter concern includes the ominous potential for
the government to actually commandeer religious symbols and
interpret their meanings, in a seemingly unabashed governmental
violation of the true separation of the state from the role and work of
the church.2 65 While the first seems more insidious under a clause
that appears to specifically protect religion, neither promotes the
pluralism that should serve as the vital pivot point of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Yet, even though U.S. assessments have made
such observations, viewing the American jurisprudence in tandem
with Lautsi permits a more searching examination of the absurdity of
only permitting religious displays in public contexts if they also
maintain secular subtexts.
In disagreement with the concerns expressed in this Note, some
have suggested approaches to Establishment Clause cases that
represent the epitome of preferring secularism to pluralism. These
interpreters have criticized an approach that could be characterized
as the pluralistic acceptance of religious along with nonreligious
symbols, by claiming that such tolerance wrongly construes
constitutional requirements. 266 Amorphous as it is, the term
"tolerance" has also been aligned with interpreting neutrality as a
secular-focused concern. 267 Nevertheless, Frederick Mark Gedicks
chronicles the direction in which he sees the Court actually moving as

262.
Id. He additionally believes that Salazar actually did address interesting
issues: "[T]he case has gotten more and more interesting.... [M]ost members of the
Court did-in at least some way-reach the substantive merits of the decision." Id. at
31.
263.
Id. at 34-36.
264.
Id. at 40.
265.
See Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the
Establishment Clause, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 60, 66 (2010) ("[Wlhen the
government puts up the cross on the theory that it means something else-or even that
it just has a lot of meanings, none of which have any priority-the government
threatens to commandeer (or, better yet, expropriate) the meaning of the cross.").
266.
See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From ChurchState Separationto Judeo-ChristianTolerance, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691 (2010).
267.
See generally Leslie C. Griffin, Fightingthe New Wars of Religion: The Need
for a Tolerant FirstAmendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23 (2010).
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a progression (or digression, depending on preference) from strict
separation to neutrality to, currently, more toleration of religious
symbols. 268 While he is not particularly concerned with the fate of the
true meaning of religious symbols under a test that imposes a biased
neutrality by requiring secular meaning, he admits that
"contemporary neutralization" is a poor solution that satisfies neither
the proponents nor the detractors of the public display of religious
symbols. 269 Leslie Griffin's response to Salazar is basically
accomodationist: religious displays should be allowed if all religions
are permitted, but in agreement with this Note's focus, she accepts
that re-characterizing religious symbols as secular is not a productive
270
or honest translation.
One of the most prominent alternatives to the endorsement test
27 1
is the coercion test favored by a number of the current Justices.
This test may not be a complete solution to Establishment Clause
interpretation, but as a starting point, it at least avoids some of the
problems of erroneously secularizing religious symbols in the name of
neutrality. The danger remains that although the endorsement test
may not be satisfactory to a number of the Justices, 272 future
developments will result in mere case-by-case analysis, as has273been
true of the many preceding opinions on public religious display.

VI. CONCLUSION

One version of pluralism that stands in accord with the concerns
raised here in respect to both the Lautsi and Salazar issues defines
the appropriate response to symbol interpretation in the American
context as one that would "recognize that [religious symbols] are
valued by many as having religious significance," but without
"demean[ing] them as . . . mere historical remnant[s] in order not to
disrespect the non-belief of that growing minority without religious

Gedicks, supra note 266, at 692.
268.
Id. at 699-702.
269.
Griffin, supra note 267, at 64.
270.
See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text for a description of this
271.
test.
See Bartrum, supra note 258, at 35 (discussing Justice Kennedy's
272.
dissatisfaction with endorsement test); Lund, supra note 265, at 63 (noting that with
respect to at least the original incarnations of the endorsement test, there is very little
agreement on the application by the current nine Justices).
Lund, supra note 265, at 60-61; see also Lisa Shaw Roy, Salazar v. Buono:
273.
The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 72, 80-84 (noting
generally that context rather than strict application of tests will probably continue to
drive Establishment Clause jurisprudence). This prediction runs contra that of
Chemerinsky's prognostications about increasing, through concerningly arbitrary line
drawing, formalism. See Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 642.
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adherence." 274 Michael McConnell has called the religious public
display cases a treatment of "religious symbol[s]" which are
"themselves the perfect symbol of the Supreme's Court's [hostile or
indifferent] attitude toward religion." 275 The concerns expressed
about the direction of the ECHR in the original Lautsi decision bleed
into the Supreme Court's interpretation of public religious freedom.
In the original Lautsi decision, the true nature of the preservation
through secularization was summarily decried as a "far-fetched
argument that the cross, while religious in origins, had in context
taken on additional symbolic significance which eclipsed the
religious." 2 76 Instances of the public display of religious symbols
extend the opportunity to foster pluralism instead of demanding
governmental neutrality keyed to secularism. When neutrality is
defined by. the ambivalent or secular nature of the symbols
themselves, the Court is positioned as religious interpreter, and when
wishing to allow for religious expression, is encouraged to perform a
feat of falsely ironic dexterity. An interpretation of neutrality that
forces religion to receive tolerance at the expense of converting to
secularism fosters pluralism no better than a requirement that the
secular meet the demands of a religious measuring stick. A robust
pluralism should be agnostic between the two perspectives, forcing
neither to wear the other's guise.
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